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ABSTRACT
This paper summarises the key challenges for the global energy sector to fulfil its essential role in the 
world with a forward perspective from 2014 to 2040. The paper draws on scenarios and other analyses 
developed by leading institutions and firms. The global availability of extractive energy resources is not 
likely constrain global progress on human development in the chosen time perspective, but the supplies 
of oil and gas can come under strain and produce price shocks from time to time resulting from events 
affecting the supply system. A more severe challenge arises from the impacts of energy-related emis-
sions on the global climate. Actions are possible on the arenas of technology development, enterprise 
and political governance, which will significantly reduce such risks while fulfilling the energy sector’s 
contribution to improve human conditions. Six such issues of technology development are highlighted, 
and two issues of political governance: appropriate pricing of energy and emissions, and development 
of energy efficient cities.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to provide a broad overview and an appropriate perspective for the large 
global challenges for energy. Section 2 introduces the energy sector’s global mission and 
challenges, i.e. the contributions that the sector is called upon to make to improve human 
conditions. The section reviews the issues of energy as an enabler of human development and 
the climate issue related to energy use. Section 3 assesses the global prospects for energy to 
2040 by reviewing projections for energy use, emissions affecting the climate and the avail-
ability of hydrocarbons. Section 4 introduces selection issues, which can become part of the 
solution for the world’s large challenges to which the energy sector must contribute. These 
are issues in the arenas of technology development, enterprise and political governance. 
2 THE ENERGY SECTOR AND ITS GLOBAL MISSION
2.1 Energy sector: delineation
For the purpose of a discussion of global energy challenges, the energy sector can be under-
stood broadly as comprising all enterprises that supply energy products in the forms of 
combustible fuels, electricity and heat, as well as those providing goods, services, knowledge 
and governance in support of energy supply. This broad view of the energy sector includes 
enterprises (owned by commercial investors or by the government), governmental institu-
tions as well as learning institutions. Among the enterprises, there are the oil and gas 
producing firms, which have usually pursued rather different strategies and modes of opera-
tions from the ‘utility’ oriented suppliers of electricity, another essential part of the energy 
1This article has been submitted for publication in the International Journal of Energy Production and Management, 
Energy Quest, WIT Press, Southampton and Boston.
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sector. There are suppliers of systems for providing renewable energy, and more generally, 
the engineering firms and other suppliers of all goods and services required for extracting and 
supplying energy.
2.2 Energy as an enabler of human development
It is well known that energy, supplied in various suitable forms, essentially supports eco-
nomic development and improving human conditions. Figure 1 is a plot of 66 countries, some 
of which are identified by names, in terms of their energy consumption per person and gross 
domestic product per person at purchasing power parity. The total world result is also shown. 
The scatter of plots broadly around a rising direction indicates a tendency for high-income 
economies to consume more energy than low-income ones. This observation is supported by 
the correlation coefficient of 0.72 between the two data sets. 
As an example from Fig. 1, Japan’s energy consumption per person is eight times that of 
India’s, while Japan’s GDP per person is nine times that of India’s. For India in the future to 
approach Japan’s level of affluence, there is little doubt that India’s energy consumption will 
have to increase significantly. It will not necessarily have to rise eightfold, as exposed below.
The benefits that users of energy seek are not obtained directly from energy as such, but 
from various functionalities enabled by energy in combination with relevant equipment: 
mobility for persons, movement of goods, industrial process heat, light, comfortable indoor 
temperature, electric and electronic applications, etc. For each type of functionality, the 
applied equipment and technology can vary in energy efficiency, i.e. the ratio between energy 
spent and functionality obtained, whose improvement has been an important aim of technol-
ogy development since the 1970s. 
While indicating a positive relationship between income and energy consumption, Fig. 1 
also suggests that this relationship is not linear. Switzerland has more than double the income 
per person as the Czech Republic, but consumes less energy per person. Economic structure 
Figure 1: Energy consumption and production per person in selected countries. Based on data 
from the World Bank database and BP statistics [20].
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is at play here: an economy dominated by service sectors can be wealthy while having mod-
est energy consumption. Russia’s rather high energy consumption relative to its economy is 
clearly driven in part by the geographical realities of cold winters and long distances. 
Countries having large energy production tend to also have high energy consumption relative 
to their economies, which draws two possible explanations: that significant amounts of 
energy are spent in producing usable forms of energy and (or) that governments having 
abundant domestic energy tend to keep its prices low, thereby stimulating practices of 
high-energy consumption.
Figure 2 relates the energy consumption of nations to the Human Development Index 
(HDI) [1], which incorporates assessments of a broad range of social qualities of nations. The 
HDI is also positively correlated with national energy consumption, but the wider scattering 
of plots compared with Fig. 1 suggests that energy consumption is less strongly linked to 
human development broadly assessed than it is linked to the economic dimension 
of development.
As seen from Fig. 2, Japan, Switzerland and Denmark are among the best performers in 
terms of HDI, while consuming energy in amounts which are far from the highest (but also 
far from the lowest) in international comparison. Japan and Switzerland have historically had 
to procure most of their energy from abroad. Denmark has been a modest net oil exporter of 
oil since 1997 but has continued to impose large taxes on oil consumption. All three countries 
pursued energy policies which ensured adequate availability of energy for their economies, 
but without trying to achieve competitive advantage by making energy cheap. Energy has 
been an enabler, but not a prime driver, of human development and of economic growth in 
these countries.
For some countries that are large net exporters of oil and gas, one can observe a combina-
tion of large energy consumption and unimpressive results on HDI. In such cases, energy 
prices for domestic consumption are often subsidised. Established economic theory applied 
Figure 2: Energy consumption and Human Development Index for selected countries. Based 
on data from UNDP [1] and BP [4].
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to such cases identifies two reasons for high-energy consumption which does not help human 
development or economic growth: Weak stimuli for energy efficiency and buyer trade-offs 
towards more energy-intensive functionalities.
The argument made above can be concluded as follows: energy is an important enabler of 
economic growth and general human development. The people in this world who currently 
live in conditions of low income and low human development will need more energy to 
improve their conditions in the future. But higher energy consumption does not automatically 
improve human conditions. A high level of human development can be attained with more or 
less energy consumption, depending on the efficiency of energy applications and trade-offs 
between more or less energy intensive functionalities. 
2.3 Energy and environmental sustainability
Emissions of CO2 from combustion of coal, oil and gas are associated with dangerous changes 
to the global climate. Three assertions are central to this association:
1. The global climate is undergoing significant changes.
2. These climate changes are caused, at least in part, by human activity, including emissions 
to the atmosphere resulting from the use of coal, oil and gas.
2. The climate changes are set on a path towards inflicting serious damage on natural envi-
ronments and societies of the world.
The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) is the leading international insti-
tution for assessment of climate change, drawing on large scientific capabilities from many 
nations. It has delivered substantial support for the three assertions above, while acknowledg-
ing that the underlying science is complex and carries uncertainties. 
The assertion of ongoing climate change is supported by numerous observations and 
reconstructed time data series describing conditions of the earth’s surfaces, waters and atmos-
phere. The average global surface temperature over sea and land is estimated to have risen by 
0.85°C since 1885. Warming has occurred over almost the entire globe, though to varying 
extents. The global mean sea level is estimated to have risen by 19 cm since 1901. The 90% 
confidence intervals for these estimates are stated as 0.65°C to 1.06°C for average global 
warming since 1885, and 17–21 cm for sea-level rise since 1901 [2].
The assertion of human influence on the climate is supported by measurements of atmos-
pheric components such as CO2 as shown in Fig. 3, in combination with data models that 
provide explanations for the relationships between observed parameters. Figure 3 represents 
the measurements of CO2 in the atmosphere at Mauna Loa, a mountain on the Hawaii islands 
in the Pacific Ocean. The air there is sufficiently remote from significant local influences so 
as to be representative of the global atmosphere. As seen from the figure, the CO2 concentra-
tion is on steady and rising trend, having increased by some 20% since the 1970s. Combustion 
of coal, oil and gas is the likely main cause of the increase, though there are also other causes, 
notably the conversion of large areas of forest to arable land. Figure 3 also shows seasonal 
cycles, whose likely cause is the absorption and release of CO2 from plants in the 
Northern hemisphere.
The assertion of climate change being on a path towards inflicting serious damage is based 
on data modelling, supported by observations of events to which global climate change is 
likely to have contributed [3]. Increased occurrence of floods, wildfires and crop damage 
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from weather conditions are among the projected consequences of climate change, which in 
turn can affect many peoples’ lives through food shortages, inhabitability, migration 
and conflict.
The future impacts of energy-related emissions through climate change on the environ-
ment and on human conditions cannot be precisely forecasted or modelled. Established 
knowledge provides strong reason to assume that there is a significant risk of serious damage 
from global emissions, and that the risk increases with the cumulative amount of emissions.
A target of limiting temperature increase so as not to exceed 2°C was agreed internation-
ally in 2010 within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The target 
is a somewhat arbitrary negotiated result of conflicting considerations. Claims are often heard 
that the target is too high for the world’s environment but too low for the world’s combined 
ability to make adequate decisions. Nevertheless, being a number which carries the authority 
of a large international body and is readily recalled by many, the 2° target is often cited as the 
relevant criterion for effective global climate policy. 
2.4 The global role of the energy sector 
In view of the challenges reviewed above, the global energy sector is called upon to provide 
an essential enabler of human progress: Those needing to be lifted out of poverty, those aspir-
ing to substantial economic and social growth and those wanting to sustain already high 
levels of human development all depend on energy to be available in suitable forms and at 
affordable cost. Extrapolation of past developments suggests that this will require increasing 
amounts of energy to be supplied globally, as an increasing portion of the world’s population 
advances towards higher levels of development. But already, the present level of fossil fuels 
consumption creates an unsustainable burden on the world’s climate. The energy sector also 
needs to be part of a development in which the world’s needs for energy can be met without 
inflicting serious damage on the climate.
Figure 3: Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) at Mauna Loa, Hawaii [21].
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3 PROJECTIONS
3.1 Expectations for energy consumption to 2040
The world consumed 484 Exajoules (EJ) of energy in 2010 (not including traditional use of 
biomass for fuel). Oil was the main source of primary energy with 169 EJ, followed by coal 
(148 EJ), natural gas (119 EJ), renewables (37 EJ) and nuclear power (10 EJ).2
Several public institutions and large energy firms from time to time publish projections and 
scenarios for future energy consumption. A selection of these is shown in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 4, the six middle columns show different projections and scenarios which all show 
increased energy consumption to 2035 or 2040, essentially driven by energy demand. They 
show increases of 37–64% in global energy consumption over 2010. There are two different 
scenarios from Shell, labelled ’Mountains’ and ‘Oceans’. Shell’s ‘Mountains’ scenario repre-
sents a world of entrenched positions of power and moderate economic dynamism, whereas 
the ‘Oceans’ scenario represents a more dynamic and less controlled world. Shell’s ‘Oceans’ 
scenario results in the largest energy consumption among the selected scenarios and time 
frame. From the United States Energy Information Administration [6] and from Exxon Mobil 
[7], there are single projections of energy use to 2040. From the International Energy Agency 
[8], there are two scenarios, which differ in the assumed implementation by governments of 
energy related policies for which there currently are stated intents but no firm implementation 
plans.
The six scenarios and projections referred above all show large relative increases in the use 
of renewable energy both for electricity and for fuels. Renewable fuels here include modern 
biofuels for heating purposes (but not traditional biofuels) as well as automotive fuels made 
2Based on data from BP [4] and Shell [5]. Renewable and nuclear electricity are included in their amount of 
electricity without conversion to fossil fuel equivalents, as is done in BP’s statistics.
Figure 4: Global energy consumption. 2010 and selected projections and scenarios for 2035–
2040 [4–8].
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from biomass. In spite of the strong projected growth in renewable fuels use, they are in none 
of these scenarios sufficient to avoid significant increases in the use of fossil fuels.In all sce-
narios, natural gas is expected to have the strongest growth in absolute terms. In most 
scenarios, coal and oil consumption are also projected to grow, albeit less than natural gas.
All referred scenarios also stipulate that energy consumption will grow faster than the 
world population, but slower than the world economy. IEA’s ‘New Policies’ scenario is based 
on assumed global population growth of 25%, GDP growth of 130% and energy consumption 
growth of 33%. The other scenarios differ from this mainly in projecting higher energy con-
sumption growth. The expected difference in growth rates between the global economy and 
energy consumption is driven in part by improvements in energy efficiency, in part also by 
structural conditions whereby advanced economies grow mainly in sectors which require 
relatively little energy (e.g. services sectors). 
3.2 Implications for the global climate
The six scenarios referred above have in common that they will lead to CO2 emissions which 
are inconsistent with the target of limiting the global temperature increase to 2% above the 
pre-industrial level (Section 2.3). They lend support to the assertion that the world is headed 
for a serious problem with the climate, and that something will have to give: Either ways 
must be found of supporting high levels of human development with much less energy-related 
emissions, or there will be much lower levels of human development than hoped for, or there 
will be serious changes to the global climate. The latter possibility appears most likely based 
on current developments.
Figure 4 shows, on its right side, a seventh scenario for energy consumption. It is designed 
by the IEA [8] to be consistent with limiting the global temperature increase to 2°C. This 
requires limiting the long-term CO2 content in the atmosphere to 450 ppm, which can be 
compared with the current level of around 400 ppm shown in Fig. 3. This ‘450’ scenario from 
the IEA, however, also requires large shifts towards more renewable energy after 2035. It also 
requires large-scale implementation of carbon capture and storage (CCS), mainly after 2035.
The ‘450’ scenario is based on a fundamentally different premise than the others, in that it 
seeks to answer the question: What energy consumption can be consistent with avoiding 
serious damage to the climate? In contrast, the other six scenarios and projections seek to 
answer the question: How much energy will be consumed under anticipated conditions?
Even the ‘450’ scenario allows for a slight increase in global energy consumption to 2035; 
13% above the 2010 level. In comparison with the demand-driven scenarios, it requires much 
slower growth in consumption, even bigger increases in renewable energies, decreasing con-
sumption of coal and oil, while allowing for a modest increase in natural gas consumption.
3.3 Extractive energy reserves
Concerns are sometimes raised about the global long-term capacity to supply oil and gas, 
which are considered finite resources. It will be argued here that the world is not likely to 
suffer from a global shortage of oil and gas reserves for the next several decades, although 
politically induced disturbances can cause supply constraints.
As of end 2012, the world’s oil reserves were 53 times that year’s production. The corre-
sponding figure for natural gas was 56 years, and for coal 109 years [4]. If adjusted for 
projected increases in consumption, quantities equal to the present reserves will be depleted 
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faster than those numbers indicated. More importantly, however, additions are being made to 
reserves due to successful exploration and for other reasons. 
Figure 5 indicates on a time scale the amount of oil discovered globally, the portion that 
has been produced (becoming ‘oil in the air’) and the portion remaining in the ground as 
reserves. A key feature of the figure is the consistent increase in reserves since 1990, indicat-
ing that extraction of oil from the underground has been more than replaced by reserve 
additions during nearly all those years. Another prominent feature is the large portion of 
reserves located in the Middle East, a condition that has often caused concerns aggravated by 
the persistence of conflicts in that region. Increases in reserves in the time frame shown have 
occurred mainly outside the Middle East, notably in Venezuela and Canada, which are now 
the largest oil reserve holders outside the Middle East.
Additions to global oil reserves are not solely a direct consequence of successful explora-
tion. They result also from better understanding of reservoirs already found, and importantly 
from technological advances in combination with prices which allow for the profitable 
extraction of more oil from known resources. The large reserve additions in Venezuela and 
Canada comprise mainly heavy hydrocarbons whose existence had been known for some 
time, but whose extraction was considered unfeasible until enabled by better technologies 
and/or higher prices.
Additions to oil and gas reserves at recent levels cannot continue indefinitely. Reserves 
comprise the oil and gas whose existence in the underground is known and whose extraction 
considered feasible under prevailing conditions, usually with a 90% confidence. Reserves is 
a subset of resources, which comprise all oil and gas in the ground. For given definitions of 
‘oil’ and ‘gas’, resources of oil and gas can be considered finite yet undetermined quantities. 
With reserves being a subset of finite resources, the potential for replenishing reserves is 
obviously limited at some point. 
This limitation is, however, not set to constrain global energy supply for the next several 
decades if the global oil and gas industry continues to add large reserves, as it has indeed 
done consistently for several decades. Concerns have been raised that this trend will soon 
reverse, which would induce a peak in global reserves and the capacity to supply oil and gas. 
Following are some observations in support of an expectation that global reserves and supply 
capacities for oil and gas will hold up well.
Figure 5: Global cumulative oil discoveries; produced and remaining portions [4].
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The price of Brent crude oil, currently the world’s most significant ‘marker’ oil price, has 
remained fairly stable and mostly within a range of US$ 100 to 115 per barrel for the past 
three years.3 In the 1990s, the price was usually between US$ 10 and 20 per barrel. There are 
complaints that the costs of finding, developing and producing petroleum have also risen, 
threatening to undermine the industry’s profitability in spite of the high oil and gas prices. 
One indicator of increasing costs of developing oil reserves is provided by the consultancy 
firm IHS CERA, whose Upstream Capital Cost Index increased by 130% from year 2000 to 
2012, whereas aggregate general inflation4 over the same period was 29% [9]. Numerous 
presentations and trade publications articles have reported of the industry being compelled to 
move activities into environments, which are naturally or politically inhospitable. The high 
price of oil can be seen as a consequence of the challenging operating conditions, and such 
observations underpin concerns of reserve limitations.
Increasing costs of operations, however, are a consequence as well as a cause of high 
prices. High prices trigger high expenditures on finding and producing oil, because high cash 
flows from current production provide the financial capacity, and because current high prices 
tend to cause high expectations also for future prices, which in turn justify investments in 
expensive capacity for future production. According to conventional economic theory, the 
prevailing price of a commodity can justify its production at unit costs up to that price. In this 
perspective, it is unsurprising that an increased oil price is followed by observations of 
increased costs of producing oil.
There have been frequent reports of capacity constraints in the industries providing inputs 
to petroleum exploration and production. This has allowed many such suppliers to do rather 
well financially and has allowed employees in certain professional categories to obtain salary 
levels which are clearly higher than those common in most other industries. These observa-
tions can be seen as continued effects of the large increase in oil prices over the last 15 years, 
the effects of which can be expected to normalise after some time. This suggests that there is 
elasticity in the industry’s capabilities, and that the capacities to supply oil and gas are not 
likely to run up against any absolute limitations any time soon.
There is, however, a continued potential for disruptions of a more circumstantial nature to 
the supply systems for oil and gas. Since the 1973 oil embargo, they have occurred from time 
to time, and fears of them are a persistent feature of oil and gas markets. Since both supply and 
demand of oil and of gas are fairly inelastic in the short term, and the willingness to pay for 
spare capacities is limited, the potential for disruptions and resulting price spikes will remain.
4 INTRODUCING SOLUTIONS: SOME GLOBAL CHALLENGES FOR ENERGY
The broad mission for the global energy sector can be seen as supplying the energy needed 
for societies to pursue their potential for human development, while not causing serious harm 
to the environment.
Nations that are rich in natural energy resources, notably oil and gas, also face the mission 
of converting resources in the underground to lasting benefits for the population. This is based 
on the notion, which is legislated in many jurisdictions, that such resources belong to the nation, 
irrespective of any private ownership of the land surface. The extraction of finite resources 
constitute a one-off monetisation of values granted by nature, which calls for their conversion 
into benefits which can be enjoyed by the entire population for many generations to come [10].
3From early 2011 to March 2014 (time of writing).
4As GDP deflator. The inflation numbers are related to U.S. dollars.
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Based on these broad missions, certain key challenges can be highlighted in the arenas of 
technology, enterprise and national governance. The challenges reviewed below are 
not exhaustive.
4.1 Challenges for technology development
Following is a selection issues in which developments of technology, if successful, can poten-
tially have large positive impacts on global developments. They are:
•  Photovoltaics for distributed electricity supply (Section 4.1.1).
 • ‘Unconventional’ gas supplies (Section 4.1.2).
 • Nuclear energy that can be widely accepted (Section 4.1.3).
 • Renewables: lower costs and better timing (Section 4.1.4).
 • Carbon capture and storage (Section 4.1.5).
 • Energy efficiency in all applications (Section 4.1.6).
4.1.1 Photovoltaics for distributed electricity supply
While photovoltaics has become a well-established technique for producing electricity, there 
is still a need for improvements in technology which will enable lower costs and more inte-
gration with constructed surfaces. Photovoltaics could then become an adequate source of 
electricity for large populations particularly in Africa and South Asia without the need for 
costly grid extensions, which would be powered mainly by fossil fuels. The movement 
towards distributed and mainly solar power supply would be aided by improvements in com-
mon electric appliances for households and small businesses allowing their operation on 
low-voltage and low-power levels.
4.1.2 ‘Unconventional’ gas supplies
All scenarios shown in Fig. 4 anticipate increased global consumption of natural gas. As the 
traditional main market for natural gas as a heating fuel for the Northern hemisphere is largely 
saturated, the main application of the added gas supplies will be power generation. The main 
competing fuels for power generation are coals and natural gas. Natural gas result in around 
half (or less) as much CO2 emissions per unit of electricity as coal, and over the next several 
decades global CO2 emissions may be significantly influenced by the extent to which power 
will be generated from natural gas or coal. 
From 2007 to 2012, China’s consumption of coal increased by 42%, mainly in electricity 
generation, and this is a key driver of growing global CO2 emissions. The world’s largest 
consumers of coal in 2012 were China (50%), USA (12%), India (8%) and Japan (3%).
The energy markets in the United States have changed radically since 2005 due to advances 
in natural gas production from shale formations. Natural gas at sharply reduced prices has 
replaced large quantities of coal as fuel for power generation, which is the main reason for the 
United States to have reduced its energy-related CO2 emissions by 12% from 2007 to 2012 
(www.eia.gov). Natural gas from shale has similar composition as other natural gas, but is 
often labelled as ‘unconventional’ due to the different geological conditions and production 
technologies.
There is a potential for large additional gas production from shale formations in a number 
of countries including China. For technological and other reasons, the U.S. success story is 
not directly replicated there, but such hurdles may be overcome. Shale gas in China and 
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certain other countries has the potential for significant favourable impacts on global CO2 
emissions (and other environmental benefits, too). Shale gas extraction also can have negative 
environmental impacts if not properly managed, notably in terms of water consumption and 
possible groundwater contamination.
For the longer term and contingent upon greater advances in technology, gas hydrates rep-
resent a potentially very large source of natural gas. Global resources have been estimated to 
exceed combined conventional resources of coal, oil and gas, and the resources are in many 
cases located near countries which otherwise are susceptible to requiring large quantities of 
coal for power generation.
An argument against increased natural gas use is that it too is a fossil fuel, which generates 
CO2 emissions, and can at best defer humanity’s exposure to harmful climate change if it 
displaces the more intensely CO2-emitting coal. Current developments indicate that the extra 
time that this may allow will be useful for reaching such improvements to energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, nuclear energy and/or CCS as will be required to stabilise the global 
climate.
4.1.3 Nuclear energy that can be widely accepted
A number of countries built nuclear fission reactors especially in the 1970s, with high expec-
tations for a reliable and clean mainstay of future electricity supply. Had nuclear energy 
gained wide public acceptance, which it has in some countries but not most, the climate 
problem could have been distinctly less pressing today, as large emissions from coal-based 
power generation could have been avoided.
All scenarios shown in Fig. 4 foresee increases in global nuclear power supply, but reach-
ing only 3% or less of finally consumed energy. A greater role for nuclear energy could 
reduce the climate problem, but seems contingent upon some major technological advance, 
so as to offer nuclear power without the potential to destroy and contaminate which is 
associated with present versions.
Possibly, such technological advance could come in nuclear fusion energy, which for sev-
eral decades has been subject of not yet successful research. If successful in the future, it can 
provide a potentially very large source of energy without climate gas emissions. An interna-
tionally funded, large-scale experiment facility for nuclear fusion, ITER, is currently under 
construction in France (www.iter.org). 
There are also aspirations of developing alternative versions of nuclear fission energy, 
which may avoid some disadvantages of the present versions. Thorium-based reaction is one 
such approach, currently pursued in India [11].
4.1.4 Renewables: lower costs and better timing
All scenarios shown in Fig. 4 foresee large increases in the use of renewable energy. But these 
are large relative increases from a modest base, and in the demand-driven scenarios, the 
growth in renewables is far from sufficient to offset a growing demand for fossil fuels. Only 
in IEA’s ‘450’ scenario, designed to meet a target rather than to meet expectations, do renew-
ables grow sufficiently to reduce the overall demand for fossil fuels. This entails tripling the 
use of renewables to supply heat and power from 2010 to 2035, and quadrupling their contri-
bution to electricity supply in the same time frame.
The currently predominant renewable electricity supply is hydropower. It can still grow, 
but due to limitations in the remaining hydropower potential the bulk of the growth must 
come from other sources: wind, solar, geothermal and ocean energy. 
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Technologies exist that can make this possible, and substantial advances in electricity pro-
duction from wind, solar and geothermal energies have been made in a number of countries. 
7.8% of electricity consumption in the European Union was met by wind power in 2013, 
according to the European Wind Energy Association [12]. Generous public financial support 
and/or mandated quotas for renewables have been instrumental in enabling these advances, 
entailing financial burdens on taxpayers and energy users. 
Not only is renewable power usually more costly per delivered kilowatt-hour than power 
generated from coal or gas (though dependent on local conditions); also, the power supply 
from renewables tends to be variable with natural conditions and unadapted to demand load 
profiles [13]. Handling this discrepancy between production and demand profiles for renew-
able electricity entails significant costs, and if the burden of handling it falls on conventional 
coal-based power stations, then it will tend to introduce inefficiencies, which offset some of 
the gains in avoided CO2 emissions from renewables. Hydropower with large water reser-
voirs and large load capacities can be better suited to alleviate this problem, especially if 
electricity is traded freely on large transmission lines, but this also has costs and limitations.
Scale economies in production and installation of renewable power generation have helped 
reduce their unit costs. The major renewable power technologies of wind and photovoltaics 
are already produced in volumes at which additional scale economies alone have limited 
scope for driving further cost reductions. The U.S. Department of Energy has reported that 
the average unit costs of onshore wind power in the U.S. fell sharply over the two decades to 
year 2000, but since then costs have seen a mixed development resulting from various 
influences [14].
This leaves a need for further improvements in technology to address problems, which 
constrain the implementation of renewable energy: Costs need to come down further, and the 
issue of supply intermittence and adaption to consumption loads needs to find better solu-
tions. Improvements in technology may include incremental improvements to what is already 
applied, as well as inventions triggering a break with established techniques. Since renewable 
energy production depends on local natural conditions, improvements in technologies that 
have been tried but not yet found wide application, would be welcome. This includes produc-
tion of electricity from forces in the ocean: waves, tide, ocean wind and salt gradients.
4.1.5 Carbon capture and storage
CCS is the capture of CO2 from combusted fossil fuels and injection into the underground, 
thus avoiding its accumulation in the atmosphere. The concept is best suited to large point 
sources of CO2, such as power stations. In some cases, the reinjection of CO2 may be directly 
useful as a stimulant for increased production from oil reservoirs. A number of CCS initia-
tives have been launched worldwide, several of them have been discontinued, and progress 
on CCS is described by IEA [8] as disappointingly slow.
IEA’s ‘450’ scenario (Fig. 4) includes an assumption that CCS will be implemented on a 
large scale globally. Without it, fossil fuel use would have to be much more restricted than 
shown in the scenario for the world to manage the 2°C limit for atmospheric heating 
(Section 3.2). Indeed, this limit is clearly a huge challenge even with CCS and seems entirely 
unrealistic without it. CCS therefore appears an essential component in future global climate 
management. 
Several projects have been implemented in which CO2 is captured and injected to the 
underground. This CO2, however, derives not from combustion, but usually from produced 
natural gas containing large components of CO2 in the well stream, which is separated from 
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the natural gas in order for the gas to meet the sales specification. At the Boundary Dam 
power station in Canada, a fully integrated CCS project is scheduled for completion in 2015: 
CO2 will be extracted after combustion of coal and injected into an oil reservoir to improve 
oil recovery (www.ico2n.com; www.saskpower.com). 
CCS remains a concept which is set to be of critical importance for the world’s climate 
management, requiring further development and maturing of technology to become viable on 
large scale.
4.1.6 Energy efficiency in all applications
Improving energy efficiency has been a focus of development efforts for a wide range of 
products and applications at least since the 1970s. Cars, airplanes, lighting, buildings, domes-
tic appliances and many other things now generally consume significantly less energy for the 
functionalities that they provide, than they did in past decades.
Improvements in energy efficiency are fundamentally possible because consumers and 
professional energy users ultimately do not seek the energy itself, but some functionality 
whose provision is aided by energy. Better technologies can improve the ratios between the 
functionality provided and energy consumed. Better technologies can entail the introduction 
of entirely different technologies for a given functionality (such as LED lighting as substitu-
tion for incandescent light), or incremental improvements to existing technologies (such as 
improvements in combustion engines for cars). There is no reason to believe that the scope 
for improved energy efficiencies on many fronts will be exhausted any time soon.
4.2 Challenges for enterprises in the energy sector
Enterprises are needed to transform resources and technologies into products, which energy 
users buy in order to obtain their desired functionalities. They are also needed to develop 
technologies beyond the research provided by public institutions.
Enterprises in the energy sector will be called upon to fulfil important roles in meeting the 
global challenges for energy, i.e. supplying the energy needed and avoiding serious damage 
to the climate. The challenges for energy sector enterprises can be summarised as follows:
1. Find and develop hydrocarbon reserves, especially natural gas.
2. Develop and deploy technologies referred to in Sections 4.1.1–4.1.5 above (on the area 
of energy efficiency, Section 4.1.6, development and deployment of technologies will 
primarily be driven by enterprises in other sectors, but the energy sector must adapt and 
contribute to this).
3. Obtain finance for and carry out the large investments required to expand and upgrade 
energy infrastructure in many countries.
4. Maintain efficiency and profitability in their operations, so as to be able to attract capital 
for required investments.
5. Manage their own operations for energy efficiency.
4.3 Political challenges for energy
Several key activities of the energy sector are generally driven by commercial motivation, 
such as the production, refining and distribution of oil and its products. They can happen 
without much government intervention. There are, however, several aspects of the sector in 
which governments are called upon to provide essential functions.
46 E. Jarlsby, Int. J. of Energy Prod. & Mgmt., Vol. 1, No. 1 (2015)
Governments need to manage hydrocarbon resources for the lasting benefit of host nations, 
based on the premise that the values in the ground belong to the nation and should be exploited 
for the benefit of present and future generations. 
Governments also need to contribute to the development of energy infrastructure, which is 
not readily provided by commercial entities. This usually includes large and long-term invest-
ments such as the electricity grid, pipeline systems for natural gas and for district heating, and 
strategic energy reserves. They can often be developed in a form of joint endeavour between 
Governmental and private investors, but usually with an essential role for regulatory bodies 
and/or State-owned enterprises.
And not least, governments need to provide the regulations and incentives required to pro-
tect the climate from serious harm, given that far more hydrocarbons can be extracted than 
can be released to the atmosphere as CO2 without causing such harm, and that ordinary 
markets do not provide any incentives to avoid this.
The climate issue being a global one, governments have tried to establish a global frame-
work for managing it, but not with any decisive success. The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 (www.unfccc.int). The 
Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997 under the UNFCCC, represents to date the only substantial 
implementation of a global endeavour to limit damage to the climate, but its essential obliga-
tions expired in 2012. Over the years, there have been numerous other large conventions 
which have not yielded any effective global framework for protecting the climate.
In the absence of an effective international framework, many Governments as well as the 
European Union (EU) have made individual commitments to policies for limiting climate 
impacts from within their own jurisdictions. Such policies are in some cases driven by a 
combination of different motivations: Policies that are helpful for reducing climate impacts 
have also been motivated by limiting strategic exposure from dependence on imports (USA), 
limiting pollution of cities (China) and limiting the expenditures on fuel imports (many 
countries).
Two policy areas are highlighted below, which will be essential for meeting the global 
energy challenges: Appropriate pricing of energy and emissions, and energy efficient cities.
4.3.1 Appropriate pricing of energy and emissions
IEA [8] anticipates that countries that are rich in energy resources will contribute strongly to 
growing global energy consumption and related emissions over the next several decades. 
There is a tendency in such countries to keep domestic energy prices low through subsidies 
and other mechanisms, leading to high consumption relative to the standards of the domestic 
economy and human development. Some examples of this are indicated in Figs 1 and 2. 
High energy consumption in energy-rich countries is not always an indicator of ineffi-
ciency; it can also indicate that local energy abundance provides competitive advantage in 
pursuing economic activities, which are energy intensive and usually export oriented. Trini-
dad is one such case, with its large manufacture of ammonia from natural gas. 
IMF [15] estimated that subsidies for petroleum products, electricity, natural gas and coal 
reached US$ 480 billion globally in 2011, corresponding to 0.7% of global GDP and 2% of 
global Government revenues. Oil exporters accounted for two-thirds of the amount. IMF 
estimates that removing the subsidies would reduce global emissions by 13%. The subsidies 
are obviously intended to provide certain benefits for energy users, but the IMF argues that 
this way of spending public money creates huge economic distortions, and that it would be 
more wisely spent in different ways.
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There is a strong case for abolishing subsidies on fossil fuels and electricity, but the need 
for appropriate pricing goes further. Considered as an externality of negative consequence, 
conventional economics suggests that emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere should carry a 
negative price. There are two established methods of implementing this: Carbon tax and 
tradable emissions permits [16]. The debate on which among the two is the better option will 
not be pursued here. Clearly, however, in view of the challenge of CO2-induced climate 
change, a form of negative price on emissions is justified.
Ideally, the system for imposing burdens on CO2 emissions should be uniform and global. 
That seems unlikely to happen any time soon. Some national and regional schemes have been 
implemented. The EU continues to operate a system of emission permits as first established 
for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. CO2 taxes are imposed on automotive fuels and a 
host of other fuels in several countries. They need not increase the overall tax burden in the 
country, as they may be offset by reductions in other taxes. 
A problem, however, arises when CO2 taxes are imposed in a country with effects for 
industries which are internationally competitive, as this will tend to drive production and jobs 
away the CO2–taxing country to other countries, without necessarily saving any global CO2 
emissions. Countries need to consider such effects carefully, while still applying an appropri-
ate burden on CO2.
4.3.2 Energy efficient cities
An increasing portion of the world’s population lives in cities. Rapid economic growth, such 
as China’s, leads also to rapid growth of cities in terms of population and in terms of built 
space, as any recent visitor to China can attest.
The way cities grow depends on market forces as well as public planning. Political deci-
sions on land use and construction in cities can have very long-term implications: Many 
European city dwellers’ daily routines are still influenced by decisions made 800–1000 years 
ago on building cathedrals. Today’s city planners routinely make decisions whose impacts are 
likely to last for many decades and possibly centuries.
The way cities grow significantly influences energy use. Cities in the USA are generally 
much more extensive in area than European cities of similar population. More American city 
dwellers live in single-family houses and on larger plots of land, and are more dependent on 
cars for their daily routines. This has implications for energy requirements for homes and for 
transport, and is an important reason why energy consumption in the USA is much higher than 
in European countries of similar development level. Newman and Kenworthy [17] showed that 
large American cities such as Houston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York had around three 
times the energy consumption per capita as large similarly sized European cities (Paris, 
London, Berlin and Vienna), while the latter had much higher population densities. Energy 
consumption in cities depends not only on population density, but also on factors such as build-
ing standards, spatial allocation of activities, energy infrastructure and the transport systems.
The high-energy consumption of American cities is a consequence of city planning deci-
sions, which cannot easily be reversed. This points to the importance that planners of fast 
growing cities, of which there are many in Asia, provide for energy effectiveness and other 
environmental qualities.
Population density in cities does not seem to impair the quality of living there. On the 
contrary; the consultancy Mercer [18] has assessed the quality of living of 223 world cities, 
albeit from the perspective of expatriate professionals’ families living there temporarily. 
The 20 highest ranking cities included 13 European and no U.S. cities.
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Copenhagen ranked ninth on Mercer’s quality of living list and is, with 7378 inhabitants 
per square km, densely populated even by European standards. The city has an ambitious 
plan for becoming CO2 neutral by 2025, and for making the insights gained in the process 
available to other cities of the world [19]. The city reduced CO2 emissions by 21% from 2005 
to 2011. It is already noted for widespread use of bicycles, facilitated by road facilities 
designed to favour bicycles as a convenient and cheap transport in the city. A district heating 
system of hot water pipes carries heat from garbage incineration to heat buildings. High 
standards for heat insulation of buildings apply. Windmills within city limits and in the shal-
low sea outside will be supplemented by a biomass power generator, whose surplus heat will 
also feed into the district heating. Copenhagen is an example of a city which can improve on 
its already high environmental qualities, helped by a favourable physical configuration of the 
city, while preserving its position as one of the world’s best cities in which to live. 
SUMMARY
This paper has argued that the large challenges for the world’s energy sector are to supply the 
energy required for societies to fulfil their potentials for human development, without inflict-
ing serious harm to the world’s climate. For national governments as custodians of resources 
belonging to the nation, there is also the challenge of converting those resources to lasting 
benefits for the population.
Based on a selection of projections and scenarios from leading institutions and energy 
firms, the energy sector will be capable of providing the quantities of energy required to 2040 
and beyond. There is the added challenge of making suitable forms of energy available to 
large sections of the world population who are currently deprived of it, but this does not 
always require supply of energy in conventional forms. The world is also heading for a seri-
ous problem with climate change induced largely by emissions from fossil energy use. 
The energy sector must contribute to providing solutions to this problem.
Six issues are highlighted in which technology developments will be critical to meeting the 
large energy challenges: Photovoltaics for distributed power, unconventional gas resources, 
lower costs and improved timing for renewables, nuclear energy, which can be widely 
accepted, CCS, and energy efficiency in all applications.
For the political dimension of the energy sector, two critical issues are highlighted: Gov-
ernments all over the world must provide for appropriate pricing of energy and emissions, so 
as to avoid the economic distortions from subsidies and to impose an adequate economic 
burden on emissions which contribute to the climate problem. And governments must plan 
for cities to become energy efficient, for which the plan being implemented for the city of 
Copenhagen is proposed as an inspirational example. 
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